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Abstract 
The purpose of this study is to find empirical evidence whether corporate governance mechanisms (ownership 
structure, independent commissioners, and audit committee characteristics) affect the level of voluntary disclosure of 
Internet Financial Reporting (IFR). Populations used in this study are all of 420 Indonesian companies listed in Indonesian 
Stock Exchange (IDX) in the period of 2010. The sample of this research is determined using purposive sampling method. 
There are 95 companies fulfill the criteria. Data were analyzed using multiple regression analysis. The result indicates that 
among corporate governance mechanisms, only audit committee meeting frequencies influence voluntary disclosure of 
IFR.  
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1. Introduction 
Full disclosed information plays an important role in representing management’s transparency and 
accountability in conducting the business. Traditionally, entities use a paper-based reporting system to share 
any information to their stakeholders [1]. During these two past decades, internet becomes an alternative 
media used by entities to disseminate any information to their stakeholders. This alternative media is a 
paperless-based reporting system and is often called as Internet Financial Reporting (IFR) [1]. IFR is one 
example of entities’ voluntary disclosure. In certain developing countries such as Indonesia, this type of 
disclosure has not been formally regulated [2]. Entities adopt IFR based on certain motives, such as to publish 
a more up-date information, to increase efficiency and effectiveness [3], and to reduce information asymmetry 
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as well [4]. Reference [5] suggests, a sound corporate governance is needed to support a more transparent 
disclosure. Good Corporate Governance (GCG) supported by a strong regulation can avoid financial 
disclosure from any possible misstatements [6]. There are still limited numbers of research examining the 
association between corporate governance and IFR, especially in developing countries. Reference [3] found 
an association between IFR and governmental and institutional ownership. Reference [7] found a positive 
association between IFR timeliness and size, type of industry, liquidity, ownership structure, and size and 
composition of the board of commissioner. Reference [8] found empirical evidence that board composition 
and ownership structure influence IFR timeliness in Irish companies. Reference [3] showed that corporate 
governance mechanism influence disclosure transparencies measured by the level of Internet Financial 
Reporting Behaviour. Reference [9] found that board of commissioner independency, size of board of 
commissioner, and the number of shareholders influence IFR practice in Malaysian companies. Reference 
[10] found empirical evidence that the size of board of commissioner influences the extent of Internet 
Corporate Reporting (ICR) disclosure in Indonesian companies. This study tries to find empirical evidence 
whether ownership structure (managerial and blockholder ownership), independent commissioner, and audit 
committee characteristics (meeting frequencies and audit committee competencies) influence the level of 
Internet Financial Reporting especially in the context of Indonesian companies listed in Indonesian Stock 
Exchange. This study is important to conduct in the context of Indonesian companies as IFR is relatively a 
new media of disclosure utilized by Indonesian companies. Moreover, there is still very limited number of 
research in this field in Indonesia. 
2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
2.1. Agency theory, corporate governance mechanism, and internet financial reporting 
Agency theory discuss about relationship between principal (owner/shareholders) and agent (management). 
Reference [11] states that agency relationship arises when one or more individual (principal) hire another 
individual (agent) to provide service. Agency theory states that a rational agent will act for their own interest, 
and not for their shareholders [6]. These managers’ behavior occurs because they have more complete 
information about company than the owner (or it can be called as Asymmetric Information). The asymmetric 
information and self-serving behavior of manager enabling them to make decisions and policies those are less 
beneficial to company. These conditions lead to corporate governance which is lack of transparency 
disclosure about company’s performance to principal [12]. Agency theory is closely related to corporate 
governance. Corporate governance mechanism aimed to ensure governance system within an organization. 
Reference [13] states that disclosure and transparency are important aspect in implementation of good 
corporate governance. Agency theory provides a framework that relates disclosure with corporate governance 
[14]. Corporate governance mechanism applied to control agency problems and ensure managers’s behavior 
in line with the interest of shareholders. In the perspective of agency theory, there are two relationships 
between corporate disclosure policy i.e. complementary or substitution relationship [14]. Complementary 
relationship occurs when the adoption of corporate governance mechanism, strengthen internal controls and 
minimize the possibility for managers to withhold information for their own interest [14]. This leads to 
improved financial reporting quality and comprehensive disclosure. Therefore, if corporate governance is 
complementary, and then by strengthen of corporate governance mechanism, companies will tend also to 
make voluntary disclosure. On the other hand, substitution relationship arises when governance mechanism 
can reduce information asymmetry and opportunistic managers’ behavior which is decreased monitoring and 
disclosure [14]. Thus companies prefer to raise one of the components because management considers the 
application of corporate governance is a "guarantee" for investors, and can reduce agency costs caused by 
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information asymmetry [15]. Internet Financial Reporting (IFR) is a media for company to disseminate their 
financial statements through internet, definitely in company's website. Some of the accounting literature states 
that the IFR is a form of voluntary disclosure practices as a media, not as information content [16]. Internet 
Financial Reporting (IFR) refers to the use of corporate websites in disseminates information about the 
company's financial performance [17]. Financial information provided by the company through the website 
i.e. financial statements; partial financial reports; and other financial information relates to summary data such 
as: stock quotes, analysis reports, operational management discussions, corporate news, and others company 
specific information [18]. Based of these definitions, it can be said that IFR provides many kind of 
information about the company, both financial and non-financial information, and can be used by users to 
make decisions. 
2.2. Managerial ownership and IFR 
Managerial ownership represents proportion of entities’ shares owned by management of the entities. 
Managers, who are also the shareholders of the entities, are motivated to increase entities’ values as well as to 
increase shareholders’ wealth as it will also increase their own wealth. Therefore, managers tend to decrease 
their opportunistic behaviour. Governance mechanisms that have capabilities to decrease management’s 
opportunistic behaviour and information asymmetry can reduce the level of monitoring and voluntary 
disclosure [14]. In other words, managerial ownership substitutes voluntary disclosure, including IFR. 
Although [19]  as well as [3] did not find any association between managerial ownership and voluntary 
disclosure including IFR, [20] found empirical evidence that managerial ownership affects voluntary 
disclosure negatively. Therefore, the first hypothesis proposed is, managerial ownership influence the level of 
IFR negatively. 
2.3. Blockholder ownership and IFR 
Blockholder ownership represents the percentage of ordinary shares owned by substantial shareholders 
(5% or more). A high blockholder ownership shows a tight monitoring by outsiders to the management of the 
entities. This kind of monitoring will encourage managers to increase their performance and to manage the 
business more transparently. In turn, it will also decrease managers’ opportunistic behaviour. Based on [14] 
concept, blockholder ownership substitutes voluntary disclosure, including IFR. Although [20] did not find 
any evidence that blockholder ownership influence voluntary disclosure, [3] found empirical evidence that 
blockholder ownership affects voluntary disclosure negatively. Therefore, the second hypothesis proposed is, 
blockholder ownership influence the level of IFR negatively. 
2.4. Independent commissioner and IFR 
Independent commissioners are commissioners that are not the management of the entities. Independent 
commissioners play important role in monitoring the accounting process, in increasing financial statements 
reliability [3], and also in ensuring the application of internal control system [21]. Moreover, independent 
commissioner can also reduce management’s opportunities to hold certain information for their own favour. It 
means that in line with [14] concept, independent commissioner complements voluntary disclosure, including 
IFR. Although [10] did not find any evidence that independent commissioner influence IFR, [5] found 
empirical evidence that independent commissioner affects voluntary disclosure positively, while [3] and [9] 
found that independent commissioner affects IFR positively. Therefore, the third hypothesis proposed is, 
independent commissioner influence the level of IFR positively. 
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2.5. Audit committee meeting Frequency and IFR 
Audit committee conducts meeting both with internal and external parties. The objectives of the meeting 
are to discuss about the financial statements preparation as well as the internal control and GCG application. 
The meeting frequencies conducted by audit committee positively related with the level of internal control 
and management control effectiveness and also with the level of GCG application. Based on [14] concept, 
audit committee meeting frequencies complement voluntary disclosure, including IFR. Although [9] did not 
find any evidence that audit committee meeting frequencies influence IFR, [3] found empirical evidence that 
audit committee meeting frequencies affect IFR positively. Therefore, the fourth hypothesis proposed is, audit 
committee meeting frequencies influence the level of IFR positively. 
2.6. Audit committee competency and IFR 
Audit committee supports the board of commissioner in monitoring financial statements preparation, 
internal control mechanism, and good corporate governance application. In order to function effectively, 
having financial literacy is a must for audit committee members. If the proportion of audit committee 
members having accounting and/or finance educational background is higher, the performance of the audit 
committee will also be higher. This in turn, will increase the quality of financial statements prepared [22], 
limit managers’ opportunistic behavior [22], and increase voluntary disclosure. In line with [14] concept, 
audit committee competency complements voluntary disclosure, including IFR. Reference [3] found empirical 
evidence that audit committee competency affects IFR positively. Therefore, the fifth hypothesis proposed is, 
audit committee competency influences the level of IFR positively. 
2.7. Explanatory factors 
The agency theory states that big firms have higher agency costs than small firms [11]. In order to reduce 
this agency cost, big firms adopt a more extensive and comprehensive disclosure. Big firms also have a 
complete and sophisticated management information system, and it makes possible for these firms to generate 
comprehensive information and to use internet facility as a mean to share the information to the shareholders 
[16]. Entities with good financial performance tend to report their financial condition more completely and 
extensively compared to those with poor financial condition [16]. Entities’ financial performance can be 
measured, for example, using profitability and liquidity ratios. Entities with high level of profitability and 
liquidity are considered to be in good condition, and tend to adopt a more detail disclosure to inform their 
activities voluntarily in the form of IFR [16]. Leverage represents entities’ dependencies on debt. Entities with 
high rate of leverage need to share more extensive information to the stakeholders. They need to inform their 
capabilities to pay debts. They also need to share positive information so that creditors and shareholders are 
not only focus in this high leverage. Compared to paper-based financial reporting, more extensive information 
can be disclosed in the form of IFR [23]. 
3. Research methods 
3.1. Population and sample 
Populations of this research are all 420 companies listed in The Indonesian Stock Exchange in the period 
of 2010. Sample of this research is determined using purposive sampling method, based on 6 criteria as 
follows: (1) the companies are not bank, credit agencies other than bank, securities, insurance, and holding 
and other investment companies; (2) the companies have websites to share financial and nonfinancial 
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information, not only to advertise their products; (3) the website is not under construction; (4) the companies 
do not report equity deficiency; (5) the financial statements are denominated in rupiah; and (6) the companies 
have all data needed in this research. There are 95 companies fulfil these criteria. 
3.2. Research data 
The data of this research are categorized as secondary data. Corporate governance mechanism data and 
financial ratios data are gained from annual report of sample companies for the year 2010 and downloaded 
from www.idx.co.id. Financial and nonfinancial data to measure the level of IFR are taken from companies’ 
website. 
3.3. Variables 
Dependent variable of this research is the level of voluntary disclosure in the form of IFR. This variable is 
measured using Internet Disclosure Index (IDI) developed by [24]. This index consists of 50 items to measure 
the content (40 items) and the presentation (10 items) of companies’ website. In more detail, 40 items of 
website content consist of accounting and financial information (15 items), corporate governance information 
(9 items), corporate social responsibility (CSR) and Human Resources Information (8 items), contact detail to 
Investor Relation (IR) and related information (8 items), while 10 items of website presentation consist of 
material processable formats (3 items) and technological advantages and user support (7 items). Each item 
disclosed will be scored 1. Finally, the total score is divided by 50 to get the IDI. Independent variables used 
in this research are managerial ownership, blockholder ownership, independent commissioners, audit 
committee meeting frequencies, and audit committee competency. Managerial ownership is the percentage of 
the number of shares owned by managers, affiliated commissioners, and directors to the total number of 
outstanding shares. Blockholder ownership is the proportion of shares owned by substantial shareholders (5% 
or more). Independent commissioner is determined as the percentage of independent commissioners to the 
total number of board of commissioner members. Audit committee meeting frequencies are the number of 
meeting frequencies held by the audit committee, both with internal and external parties, in one year. Audit 
committee competency is the proportion of audit committee members having finance and/or accounting 
educational background to the total number of audit committee members. Moreover, this research uses 4 
control variables, i.e. companies’ size measured by natural logarithm of companies’ total assets, profitability 
measured by ROA, liquidity measured by current ratio, and leverage measured by debt to equity ratio. 
3.4. Methods of data analysis 
The data in this research are analysed using multiple regression analysis. The regression equation is as 
follows: 
 
 
IDI = α + β1MOWN + β2BOWN + β3IC + β4MF + β5AC + β6SIZE + β7Profit + β8Liquid + β9Lev + ε1      (1) 
 
which is IDI is the level of IFR, MOWN is managerial ownership, BOWN is blockholder ownership, IC is 
independent commissioner, MF is audit committee meeting frequencies, AC is audit committee competency, 
SIZE is companies’ size, Profit is profitability (ROA), Liquid is liquidity (current ratio), and Lev is leverage 
(debt to equity ratio). Before conducting data analysis using the multiple regression analysis, data are 
exercised in order to comprehend whether they serve the classic assumptions or not. The classic assumptions 
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in this study include normality, tested using Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test, multicollinearity, tested using 
Tolerance Value and Variance Inflation Factor, and heteroskedasticity, and tested using Glejser Test. 
Autocorrelation test is not needed in this research as the data used are cross sectional data.  
4. Results of data analysis and discussion 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
The result of descriptive statistics tests of IFR is illustrated in Table 1.  
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of IFR 
 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Content 95 0.02 0.60 0.24 0.16 
Presentation 95 0.00 0.18 0.08 0.04 
IDI 95 0.04 0.78 0.32 0.19 
 
Content represents variations of information disclosed by companies in their websites, while presentation 
represents information presentation and internet technology sophistication used in the companies’ websites. In 
general, types of information disclosed and information presentation in the companies’ websites are still very 
limited, only 24% and 8%, respectively. This result also implies that Indonesian companies are still focus on 
the types of information disclosed in their websites and has not fully utilized internet technology to support 
companies’ disclosure. Overall, the level of voluntary disclosure disclosed by Indonesian companies in the 
form of IFR is still low, approximately 32%. Table 2 shows the result of descriptive statistics test of 
independent and control variables. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of independent and control variables  
 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
MOWN 95 0.00 0.70 0.03 0.11 
BOWN 95 0.05 0.99 0.67 0.21 
IC 95 0.20 1.00 0.42 0.14 
MF 95 1.00 44.00 9.91 9.50 
AC 95 0.20 1.00 0.73 0.26 
SIZE 95 25.33 32.36 28.56 1.49 
Profit 95 -0.38 0.51 0.08 0.10 
Liquid 95 .010 42.59 2.46 4.44 
Lev 95 0.01 2.40 0.43 0.44 
 
 
From Table 2, it can be concluded that most of Indonesian companies’ shareholders are blockholders and 
it seems that managers tend to be minority shareholders. These facts are shown by the percentage of 
blockholder ownership and managerial ownership that are 67% and 3%, respectively. In line with the valid 
rule, 42% of the board of commissioner members are independent commissioners. However, there is a 
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company that only has 20% independent commissioners in the composition of its board of commissioner. 
There is a large variation in the audit committee meeting frequencies, from once a year up to 44 times a year. 
In general, audit committee conducted 10 meetings in the year 2010. Moreover, most of audit committee 
members have financial literacy. Although the rule requires only one of audit committee members has finance 
and/or accounting educational background, on average, 73% of audit committee members have finance and/or 
accounting educational background. 
4.2. Results of normality and classic assumption test 
The result of normality test of residuals using Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test is shown in Table 3 As the value 
of Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z is 0.559 with significance level of more than 5%, it can be summarized that the 
data come from normally distributed population. Meanwhile, the results of multicollinearity test utilising 
Tolerance Value and Variance Inflation Factor as well as heteroskedasticity test using Glejser Test are 
demonstrated in Table 4. Based on the test results, it is clearly seen that all research variables have Tolerance 
Value of more than 0.1 and Variance Inflation Factor of less than 10, demonstrating that there is no indication 
of multicollinearity. Further, the values of Glejser statistics have significance level of more than 5%, 
indicating that there is no heteroskedasticity problem. 
 
Table 3. Normality test 
 
 Unstandardized Residual 
K-S Z 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
0.559 
0.913 
 
Table 4. Multicollinearity and heteroskedasticity tests 
 
Variables Tolerance VIF  Glejser (sign.) 
MOWN 
BOWN 
IC 
MF 
AC 
SIZE 
Profit 
Liquid 
Lev 
0.771 
0.707 
0.908 
0.874 
0.910 
0.755 
0.824 
0.923 
0.840 
1.298 
1.414 
1.102 
1.144 
1.099 
1324 
1.214 
1.084 
1.190 
0.396 
0.707 
0.461 
0.466 
0.964 
0.790 
0.067 
0.999 
0.847 
 
4.3. Results of hypothesis tests 
The results of hypothesis tests are exhibited in Table 5. Based on Table 5, it can be seen that among 
independent variables used in this study, only audit committee meeting frequencies variable that is 
statistically significant at the level of 1%. Looking at the positive coefficient of this variable, it can be 
concluded that audit committee meeting frequencies affect the level of IFR positively. Therefore, only one of 
five proposed hypothesis, hypothesis 4, is supported, while hypothesis 1, 2, 3, and 5 are rejected. This study 
succeeds in finding evidence that audit committee meeting frequencies affect the level of IFR positively. 
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However, this study could not find any evidence that managerial ownership, blockholder ownership, 
independent commissioners, and audit committee competency influence the level of IFR. 
 
Table 5. Hypothesis tests 
 
Variables Regression Coefficients t-values 
MOWN -0.003 -0.018 
BOWN -0.078 -0.946 
IC -0.036 -0.330 
MF 0.006 3.458* 
AC 0.018 0.307 
SIZE 0.069 6.178* 
Profit 0.108 0.696 
Liquid -0.002 -0.552 
Lev 0.019 0.546 
Adjusted R Square    = 0.448 
F Statistics                 = 9.482* 
* Significant at the level of 1% 
 
4.4. Discussions 
This study could not find any evidence that managerial ownership influence the level of IFR negatively. 
This result is consistent with [19] and [3] but inconsistent with [20]. A very limited percentage of managerial 
ownership in Indonesian companies (only 3%) cannot eliminate the conflict of interest between managers and 
owners. Managers’ personal interests are still not in line with owners’ interests, so that managers’ 
opportunistic behaviour cannot be reduced. Therefore, because of the very low percentage, managerial 
ownership in Indonesian companies cannot influence voluntary disclosure policies, including IFR policies. 
This study also could not find any evidence that blockholder ownership influences the level of IFR negatively. 
This result is consistent with [20]. However, this result is inconsistent with [3]. This finding suggests that 
blockholder has not been able to optimize its function as a monitoring system. Besides, this study did not 
differentiate between individual blockholder and institutional blokckholder. These two groups of blockholder 
have their own different characteristics that may affect their policies on voluntary disclosure, including IFR. 
This research could not find any evidence that independent commissioners influence the level of IFR 
positively. This result is consistent with [10]. However, this result is inconsistent with [5], [3], [9], [20], and 
[25]. This finding suggests that although the proportion of independent commissioners is higher than the 
requirement, it seems that independent commissioners have not functioned properly. This can be caused by 
the selection procedures. In Indonesia, it seems that board of commissioners are established just as a 
formality, to obey the rules. The members are not independent and do not have sufficient competencies 
needed [26]. It is a common phenomenon in Indonesia that government officers or ex-government officers are 
elected as board of commissioner members as they can help the companies to get an access to the 
governmental institutions more easily [27]. It tends to be common that integrity, competency, and 
independency are not too important to be considered in selecting board of commissioner members. This study 
succeeded in finding evidence that audit committee meeting frequencies influence the level of IFR positively. 
This result is consistent with [3] but inconsistent with [9]. Audit committee conducts meeting with internal 
parties, such as board of directors, as well as with external parties, such as external auditors. The main 
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objective of the meeting is to create a kind of coordination in monitoring financial statements preparation and 
in enhancing internal control and good corporate governance application. The more frequent the meeting, the 
higher the coordination, and the more effective the monitoring system conducted by audit committee. It 
means, audit committee meeting frequencies can increase internal control and decrease managements’ 
opportunities to hold information for their own favour. Further, this can increase information disclosure, 
including voluntary disclosure in the form of IFR, comprehensively. This research could not find any 
evidence that audit committee competency influences the level of IFR positively. This result is inconsistent 
with [3]. Audit committee is not only responsible for monitoring financial statements preparation, but also 
responsible for monitoring internal control and good corporate governance application. With this wide range 
of responsibilities, finance and/or accounting competencies alone is not enough for audit committee to be able 
to function properly. It is also a must for audit committee as a team to have competencies and experiences in 
the field of law, stock market, and other related business practices [28]. This study also found that from four 
control variables, only size tends to affect the level of IFR. This study could not find any evidence that 
profitability, liquidity, and leverage affect the level of IFR. These findings suggest that companies’ financial 
performance numbers are not factors considered in deciding the variation and the extent of voluntary 
disclosures, including in deciding the level of IFR. However, this research found evidence that company size 
influences the level of IFR positively. Big firms have to afford high agency cost, and this kind of cost can be 
reduced by adopting a comprehensive disclosure policy, such as in the form of IFR. Besides, big firms have 
sufficient funds to develop sophisticated management information system that enables them to provide better 
and more comprehensive information to the stakeholders, including utilizing internet technology as a mean to 
disseminate financial and nonfinancial information in companies’ websites [10]. 
5. Closing remarks 
The objective of this study is to find empirical evidence whether corporate governance mechanism affects 
the level of Internet Financial Reporting (IFR). IFR is a media used by companies to share financial and 
nonfinancial information to their stakeholders. This study succeeded in finding evidence that audit committee 
meeting frequencies influence the level of IFR positively. However, this study did not find any evidence that 
managerial ownership, blockholder ownership, independent commissioners, and audit committee competency 
influence the level of IFR. This study has limitation in the research period used, which is only one year, the 
year of 2010, so that the result represents condition only in that period. However, one period is selected based 
on important consideration, i.e. the fact that companies’ websites are always changing. Besides, the result 
shows that the determination coefficient is only 44.8%, meaning that there are other factors influence the level 
of IFR not yet covered in this research. Finally, institutional blockholder ownership in this study was not 
separately examined from individual blockholder ownership. Based on those limitations, subsequent research 
may use the more recent period to examine the influence of corporate governance mechanism to the level of 
IFR, and also to understand the development of IFR practices from period to period, especially in the context 
of Indonesian companies. Moreover, future research can consider using other variable, such as executive 
compensation, multi division business structures, and market control. It is also important for next research to 
analyse institutional blockholder ownership separately from individual blockholder ownership to find any 
possible different results. 
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